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 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. (“Tennessee Gas”) 
submitted applications to several federal and state 
agencies seeking approval to build an interstate pipeline 
project. One such agency is the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers,1 which administers certain provisions of the 
Clean Water Act. The Corps issued a permit approving the 
project. The petitioners, Maya van Rossum and Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network (collectively, “Riverkeeper”), 
challenge that decision on the ground that the Corps acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting a “compression” 
alternative. 
 We conclude that the Corps considered the 
compression alternative but rejected it for reasons 
supported by the record. While the compression 
alternative would disturb less land, its impact would be 
mostly permanent. The pipeline project would disturb 
more land, but its impact would be mostly temporary. In 
making a policy choice between those environmental 
tradeoffs, the agency’s discretion was at its apex. We will 
therefore deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
 1 A companion case addresses challenges to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 
which granted a permit under state law approving the 
pipeline project. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y 
Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 17-1533 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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I 
A 
 At issue is the Orion Project—12.9 miles of pipeline 
looping2 that would transport an additional 135,000 
dekatherms per day of natural gas through Pennsylvania. 
Approximately 99.5% of the new pipeline would run 
alongside existing pipelines. According to Riverkeeper, 
construction will lead to deforestation, destruction of 
wetland habitats, and other forms of environmental 
damage. Riverkeeper asserts that such damage can be 
avoided by building or upgrading a compressor station. 
“Compressor stations . . . us[e] gas- and electric-powered 
turbines to increase the pressure and rate of flow at given 
points along the pipeline’s route.” Del. Riverkeeper 
                                                 
 2 “Installation of ‘looping’ along a pipeline involves 
the construction of ‘additional sections of pipe, laid 
parallel to portions of the existing pipe, which empty into 
the existing pipe at both ends of the loop pipeline.’” 
Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. F.E.R.C., 948 F.2d 
1305, 1309 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (further internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting ANR Pipeline Co. v. F.E.R.C., 
771 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see also Del. 
Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 833 
F.3d 360, 369 (3d Cir. 2016) (“‘Loops’ are sections of pipe 
connected to the main pipeline system that reduce the loss 
of gas pressure and increase the flow efficiency of the 
system.”). 
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Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 833 F.3d 360, 
369 (3d Cir. 2016). Building or upgrading a compressor 
station would increase the amount of natural gas 
transported through existing pipelines and thus avoid any 
need to build pipeline looping.3 
 Contrary to Riverkeeper’s concerns, the agencies 
concluded that the Orion Project would result in 
“minimal” and “temporary” environmental impact. Of the 
12.9 miles of pipeline looping, fewer than 2 miles would 
cross wetlands or waterbodies. The pipeline would be 
buried 2–3 feet beneath the ground, and all disturbed areas 
would be restored to their original elevations and contours 
with no net loss of wetlands. However, nearly five acres of 
forested wetlands would be de-forested and converted into 
emergent wetlands. The compression alternative, by 
contrast, would require constructing one or more 
permanent fixtures—causing permanent deforestation as 
well as light, air, sound, and greenhouse gas pollution. 
                                                 
 3 The parties focus primarily on building one or more 
new compressor stations rather than upgrading an existing 
station. See JA 2010 (“[U]pgrades to existing compressor 
stations, without looping, did not offer the same reliability 
and flexibility on the system.”). We focus our analysis 
accordingly. 
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 With that initial background in mind, we next set forth 
a brief overview of the administrative scheme and then 
describe how that process unfolded in this case. 
B 
 Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is the “lead agency” 
for evaluating interstate pipeline projects. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717n(b). As part of that role, FERC performs a technical 
environmental analysis pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Id. 
 NEPA requires FERC to take a “hard look” at the 
environmental impact of the proposed project. Robertson 
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 
(1989). If the project involves a “major Federal action” 
that would “significantly affect[] the quality of the human 
environment,” FERC must prepare a detailed 
Environmental Impact Statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
Otherwise, FERC need only prepare a concise 
Environmental Assessment. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4, 
1508.13. 
 As a condition of FERC’s approval, the applicant is 
required to obtain any additional state or federal licenses 
required by law. For example, because the Orion Project 
would discharge “dredged or fill material” into the “waters 
of the United States,” Tennessee Gas was required to 
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obtain a permit under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7). 
 The United States Army Corps of Engineers reviews 
applications for Section 404 permits. In doing so, the 
Corps applies the so-called Section 404 Guidelines (“the 
Guidelines”) issued by the Environmental Protection 
Agency. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4. See generally Coeur 
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 
261 (2009). Among other things, the Corps may not issue 
a permit where there is a “practicable alternative” with less 
adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, “so long as the 
alternative does not have other significant adverse 
environmental consequences.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). 
 In performing its alternatives analysis, the Corps may 
rely on the environmental report prepared by FERC 
pursuant to NEPA. The agencies memorialized their 
cooperative relationship in a 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding, which states that the Corps will “use the 
FERC record to the maximum extent practicable and as 
allowed by law . . . . [T]he Corps will give deference, to 
the maximum extent allowed by law, to the project 
purpose, project need, and project alternatives that FERC 
determines to be appropriate for the project.” JA 39.4 
                                                 
 4 The Memorandum of Understanding between FERC 
and the Corps supplements an Interagency Agreement 
between FERC and nine other federal agencies pursuant to 
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C 
 1. Tennessee Gas’s application. On October 9, 2015, 
Tennessee Gas submitted an application to FERC for 
approval of the Orion Project. Its application included an 
Environmental Report, which discussed and rejected 
compression alternatives. Tennessee Gas explained that 
building compressor stations would require Tennessee Gas 
“to obtain approximately 40-acres per site (total of 80 
acres).” JA 408. Building compressor stations would also 
require “permanent vegetation clearing from the area in 
order to install permanent access roads, fencing, buildings 
and other appurtenance equipment,” and would create 
“light pollution and noise impacts and may also become a 
source of [greenhouse gas] emissions.” Id. But with the 
Orion Project, “the new [right-of-way] will be allowed to 
re-vegetate to minimize and mitigate possible 
environmental impacts.” Id. The report further concluded 
that the “compression alternative would result in higher 
Project operating and fuel costs.” Id. 
 2. Public notice. On December 3, 2015, FERC issued a 
Notice of Intent and solicited public comments regarding 
the Orion Project. FERC specifically requested comments 
on “reasonable alternatives.” JA 560. On June 10, 2016, 
                                                 
Executive Order 13212 (“Actions to Expedite Energy 
Related Projects,” May 18, 2001). 
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the Corps issued its own public notice of the Section 404 
permit application. 
 3. FERC’s draft Environmental Assessment. In July 
2016, FERC circulated a non-public draft Environmental 
Assessment to the Corps for internal comment. The draft 
specifically considered and rejected a possible 
compression alternative, as conveyed in a detailed chart. 
While the draft Environmental Assessment concluded that 
compression would be “technically feasible,” its 
“economic efficiency” would be “lower” and it would 
“require permanent land use conversion” and present a 
new source of light, air emissions, and noise. JA 212. The 
draft characterized compression’s environmental impact 
as “different,” “comparable,” and “possibly lower” than 
the Orion Project. But ultimately, the draft concluded that 
the aboveground footprint of building a compression 
station is “permanent,” whereas “the bulk of the Project 
impacts are temporary (such as waterbody crossings) or 
adjacent to the existing right-of-way.” Id. 
 4. Final Environmental Assessment. On August 23, 
2016, FERC published its Environmental Assessment for 
public comments—requesting that comments “focus on 
the potential environmental effects, reasonable 
alternatives, and measures to lessen or avoid 
environmental impacts.” JA 239. For reasons that are not 
clear from the record, the final Environmental Assessment 
omitted the draft’s analysis of the compression alternative. 
The final assessment did, nonetheless, recommend a 
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“finding of no significant impact” because the Orion 
Project’s “impacts on waterbodies and wetlands would be 
minor and temporary.” JA 340, 274, 278. 
 5. Public Comments. Before the publication of the 
Environmental Assessment, “[n]one of the environmental 
comments received on the Orion Project identified specific 
alternatives to the proposed looping segments.” JA 335. 
After publication, groups including Riverkeeper 
commented on alternatives but never specifically 
addressed compression. 
 The Corps received no public comments and received 
no requests for a public hearing. 
 6. FERC Order Issuing a Certificate. On February 2, 
2017, FERC published its Order Issuing a Certificate, 
approving the Orion Project and issuing a “certificate of 
public convenience and necessity.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). 
FERC explained that it “evaluated alternatives to the 
Orion Project to determine whether they would be 
reasonable and environmentally preferable to the proposed 
project,” and “affirm[ed] the conclusion in the 
[Environmental Assessment] that no reasonable 
alternative would result in significantly less environmental 
impacts and accomplish the project’s objective.” JA 635.  
 The Order also noted that “[w]hile Delaware 
Riverkeeper presents general alternatives that would 
potentially result in less impact, Tennessee’s application 
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and its response to Delaware Riverkeeper’s comments 
provide further evidence that the Orion Project could not 
be satisfied by relying on other transportation systems or 
looping, compression, and route alternatives along 
Tennessee’s own system.” JA 635 (emphasis added). 
 7. Corps Considers and Issues a Section 404 Permit. 
Concurrently with the FERC process, the Corps reviewed 
Tennessee Gas’s application for a Section 404 permit. The 
Corps issued its permit on the same date as FERC’s order, 
February 2, 2017. The Corps incorporated the 
Environmental Assessment into its findings—concluding 
that the water impacts would be “temporary in nature” and 
the project would have a “[n]egligible effect.” JA 432–34. 
The Corps further concluded that “there are no reasonable 
or practicable alternatives” for which there would be no 
“significant adverse environmental effects,” and that the 
Orion Project complies with the Guidelines. JA 445–46, 
438. Construction was authorized to begin on March 15, 
2017. 
 8. Litigation. Riverkeeper filed this petition on March 
10, 2017. Tennessee Gas filed a motion to intervene, which 
the Court granted on March 17, 2017. On April 7, 2017, 
this Court denied Riverkeeper’s emergency motion for a 
stay. On April 26, 2017, this Court granted Riverkeeper’s 
motion to expedite the case. 
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II 
 We have jurisdiction to review this petition under the 
Natural Gas Act. Where an interstate pipeline project is 
proposed for construction, see 15 U.S.C. § 717f, we have 
“original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action 
for the review of an order or action of a Federal agency 
(other than [FERC]) . . . acting pursuant to Federal law to 
issue . . . any permit, license, concurrence, or approval . . . 
required under Federal law,” 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). 
 We review for arbitrary or capricious agency action. 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under that standard, an agency must 
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck 
Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). “We will 
. . . ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Id. (quoting 
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
III 
 Before reaching the merits, we must first address 
whether Riverkeeper waived (or forfeited) its claims. We 
conclude that it did not. Although Riverkeeper failed to 
raise the compression alternative in its comments, 
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compression was otherwise brought to the agency’s 
attention. Furthermore, Riverkeeper’s failure to raise 
arguments before FERC does not waive its objections to a 
decision by the Corps. 
 Challenges to agency action under NEPA are subject to 
a prudential waiver rule. Before bringing their NEPA 
challenges in court, parties must “structure their 
participation” in the administrative process “so that it . . . 
alerts the agency to the [parties’] position and contentions, 
in order to allow the agency to give the issue meaningful 
consideration.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 
752, 764 (2004) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 
(1978)). Under that standard, a challenger who claims that 
an agency failed to consider an environmentally preferable 
alternative must generally raise that alternative in its 
comments. Id. at 764–65. 
 Courts have recognized two exceptions to the 
prudential waiver rule. “First, commenters need not point 
out an environmental assessment’s flaw if it is ‘obvious.’ 
Second, a commenter does not waive an issue if it is 
otherwise brought to the agency’s attention.” Sierra Club, 
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Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043, 1048 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 765).5 
 In this case, Riverkeeper actively participated in the 
administrative process but never raised what has now 
become its central argument—that compression is a 
legally mandated alternative. According to the Corps and 
Tennessee Gas, Riverkeeper was required to raise that 
objection before FERC. We need not address whether the 
prudential waiver rule applies in this case where 
Riverkeeper brought challenges under the Clean Water Act 
only, not NEPA. And even if the rule did apply, 
Riverkeeper has not waived its claims for two reasons. 
 First, the compression alternative was “otherwise 
brought to the agency’s attention.” Bostick, 787 F.3d at 
1048. Tennessee Gas addressed the compression 
alternative in its initial application to FERC and in its 
follow-on application to the Corps. And as described 
below, the Corps considered and rejected the compression 
alternative. It did so for substantially the same reasons set 
forth in Tennessee Gas’s application. The compression 
                                                 
 5 The Ninth Circuit treats these two exceptions as one. 
See Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1132 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“This court has interpreted the ‘so 
obvious’ standard as requiring that the agency have 
independent knowledge of the issues that concern 
petitioners.”). But whether there is one exception or two, 
in either case, an exception applies here. 
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alternative is thus fair game for litigation and cannot come 
as a surprise to the Corps. 
 The Corps objects that “the general idea” of 
compression may have been before it, but not 
Riverkeeper’s “particular alternative.” Resp. Br. 21. But 
the crux of Riverkeeper’s argument—that compression 
would have a smaller environmental impact—does not 
rely on any specific implementation of the compression 
alternative that was never presented to the agency.6 See 
Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist. v. Fed. Transit Admin., No. 
12-cv-9861, 2016 WL 4650428, at *76 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 
2016). Riverkeeper’s basic argument was considered (and 
responded to) in Tennessee Gas’s application, JA 408, and 
was further discussed in FERC’s draft Environmental 
Assessment, see JA 212 (characterizing compression’s 
environmental impact as “different,” “comparable,” and 
“possibly lower”). Because the Corps “had independent 
knowledge of the very issue that concerns [petitioner] in 
this case, . . . ‘there is no need for a commentator to point 
them out specifically in order to preserve its ability to 
challenge a proposed action.’” 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coal. v. 
                                                 
 6 Riverkeeper does dispute Tennessee Gas’s position 
that two compressor stations would be needed to fulfill the 
project’s purpose. According to Riverkeeper, only one 
new station would be required. But as explained below, 
that dispute is not ultimately material to our conclusion. 
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Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 765). 
 Second, the Corps’ process made it impracticable for 
Riverkeeper to lodge its objections with the Corps. The 
Corps opened its thirty-day comment period on June 10, 
2016, but FERC did not publicly release its Environmental 
Assessment until August 23, 2016—after the expiration of 
the Corps’ comment period. Any deficiencies with the 
Environmental Assessment for purposes of the Clean 
Water Act thus could not have been addressed to the Corps 
by comment. 
 To be sure, Riverkeeper had every opportunity to object 
before FERC. It never did, including in its petition for 
rehearing filed February 14, 2017, most likely waiving its 
right to challenge FERC’s treatment of the compression 
alternative in court. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). For that 
reason, Tennessee Gas characterizes this action against the 
Corps as a “disingenuous[]” collateral attack against 
FERC. Intervenor Br. 19. 
 Certainly Riverkeeper could have raised its objections 
with FERC, and FERC might have communicated those 
objections to the Corps. But notwithstanding the agencies’ 
cooperative relationship, each must fulfill independent 
legal responsibilities. In particular, FERC’s analysis under 
NEPA is substantively different than the Corps’ analysis 
under the Clean Water Act. See Utahns for Better Transp. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1186 (10th Cir. 
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2002), as modified on reh’g, 319 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 
2003) (noting that, unlike the Clean Water Act, “NEPA 
does not require the selection of the least damaging 
practicable alternative”). For that reason, an 
Environmental Assessment might be sufficient for 
purposes of NEPA but not for purposes of the Clean Water 
Act. The Guidelines contemplate that possibility and 
require the Corps to “supplement [deficient] NEPA 
documents with . . . additional information.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230.10(a)(4). Thus, a party might have a viable objection 
before the Corps but not before FERC. At bottom, the 
Corps and Tennessee Gas ask us to ignore Riverkeeper’s 
arguments because those arguments were not raised before 
a different agency administering a different statute. We 
decline to do so. 
 Even if the prudential waiver rule applies in this case, 
we conclude that Riverkeeper did not waive its arguments. 
The compression alternative was brought to the Corps’ 
attention, and Riverkeeper was not required to present its 
Corps-specific objections to FERC. We proceed, then, to 
the merits. 
IV 
 Riverkeeper argues that the Corps’ decision to issue a 
Section 404 permit was arbitrary and capricious for three 
reasons: (1) the Corps adopted an irrationally narrow 
definition of the project’s “basic purpose”; (2) the Corps 
failed to consider the compression alternative; and (3) the 
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Corps improperly rejected the compression alternative. 
We reject each argument in turn. 
A 
 First, Riverkeeper argues that the Corps adopted an 
irrationally narrow definition of the project’s “basic 
purpose,” precluding alternatives like compression. We 
reject this argument for two reasons. First, Riverkeeper 
conflates the separate roles played by a project’s “basic 
purpose” and “overall purpose.” Second, any error arising 
from the project’s definition is harmless. 
 Under the Guidelines, the Corps is required to conduct 
an alternatives analysis. But what counts as an alternative? 
To determine that, the agency looks to the range of projects 
that could achieve the same goal as the proposed project. 
“An alternative is practicable if it is available and capable 
of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing 
technology, and logistics in light of overall project 
purposes.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 Erroneously defining the “overall project purpose” can 
be consequential. If it is defined too narrowly, the Corps 
might arbitrarily constrict the universe of viable 
alternatives. See Jones v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 741 
F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Corps may not 
manipulate the project purpose so as to exclude alternative 
sites . . . .”); Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 882 
F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Obviously, an applicant 
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cannot define a project in order to preclude the existence 
of any alternative sites and thus make what is practicable 
appear impracticable.”). 
 Separately, the Corps is required to determine whether 
a project is “water dependent.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). 
For that, the Corps evaluates whether the project 
“require[s] access or proximity to or sit[s] within the 
special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose.” 
Id. (emphasis added). We will return to water dependency 
in a later section. For now, it is enough to understand that 
the basic purpose (for determining water dependency) is 
distinct from the overall purpose (for determining 
practicable alternatives). 
 In this case, FERC and the Corps7 adopted the 
following definitions: 
• Overall project purpose: “to increase natural gas 
transportation in order to respond to the needs of 
three contracted shippers.” 
  
                                                 
 7 Under the regulatory scheme, FERC defines the 
project’s basic and overall purposes. Then, pursuant to the 
Memorandum of Understanding, “the Corps will give 
deference, to the maximum extent allowed by law, to the 
project purpose.” JA 39. 
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• Basic project purpose: “to construct natural gas 
pipeline loops.” 
JA 430–31. Riverkeeper argues that the Corps adopted too 
narrow a definition of the project’s basic purpose. By 
limiting the definition to “pipeline loops,” Riverkeeper 
argues, the Corps excluded alternatives like compression. 
In Riverkeeper’s view, the Corps could reject compression 
because it would not constitute an alternative method of 
achieving the project’s basic purpose, “construct[ing] 
natural gas pipeline loops.” JA 431. 
 But as described above, the project’s basic purpose 
does not delimit the agency’s alternatives analysis. The 
overall purpose does. See All. For Legal Action v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534, 548 
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (“Once the Corps determines the water 
dependency of a project, it no longer considers the basic 
project purpose but analyzes practicable alternatives in 
light of overall project purposes.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Here, the overall purpose was not 
defined in such a way as to exclude the compression 
alternative. Compression could very well be an alternative 
method of “increase[ing] natural gas transportation,” JA 
430, provided it also satisfied the other regulatory 
requirements. See Gouger v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
779 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (collecting 
cases, and observing that “an ‘overly narrow’ project 
purpose is a rare occurrence”). 
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 But even assuming, arguendo, that the agency 
erroneously defined the project’s basic purpose, such an 
error does not categorically compel us to reverse the 
agency’s permitting decision. “[T]he Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) directs us to take account of ‘the rule 
of prejudicial error.’ In other words, we apply a ‘harmless 
error’ analysis to any administrative action we review[.]” 
Del. Riverkeeper, 833 F.3d at 377 (footnotes omitted). As 
described below, the Corps considered the compression 
alternative. Furthermore, the Corps did not reject the 
compression alternative on the ground that it could not 
achieve the project’s basic purpose. 
 Both in principle and in practice, the project’s “basic 
purpose” did not arbitrarily constrain the Corps’ 
alternatives analysis. We therefore reject Riverkeeper’s 
first argument. 
B 
 Riverkeeper next argues that the Corps failed to 
consider the compression alternative.8 We reject that 
argument. Despite being omitted from FERC’s 
Environmental Assessment, compression was evaluated in 
                                                 
 8 Riverkeeper abandoned this argument. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 13:3–5 (“It did review it. Yes, no 
doubt that they did review the compression alternative.”). 
We will still briefly address it in the interest of 
thoroughness. 
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Tennessee Gas’s application and expressly referenced in 
the Corps’ findings. 
 Tennessee Gas’s application to the Corps included an 
alternatives analysis that explicitly discussed 
compression. See JA 69. The Corps’ alternatives analysis 
cross-references Tennessee Gas’s application and 
expressly identifies compression as one of the alternatives 
considered. See JA 438 (“[Tennessee Gas] examined 
several alternatives . . . including . . . Compression 
Alternatives . . . .”). That statement is sufficient to 
persuade us that the Corps in fact considered compression 
as part of its alternatives analysis.9 
 Riverkeeper objects that FERC’s final Environmental 
Assessment never mentioned compression. Indeed, the 
final document stated that FERC “did not evaluate any 
aboveground facility site alternatives.” JA 335. According 
to Riverkeeper, FERC’s failure to address compression 
becomes the Corps’ failure as well. Even granting that 
FERC had abandoned its analysis of compression, the 
Corps did not solely review the contents of FERC’s 
Environmental Assessment. See JA 445 (“[T]his office has 
                                                 
 9 Our conclusion is further supported by FERC’s draft 
Environmental Assessment, which specifically analyzed 
the compression alternative. See JA 210–12. But because 
the draft was not made publicly available and was not 
referenced in the Corps’ findings, we do not give it 
dispositive weight. 
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reviewed all the available information contained in the 
Environmental Assessment prepared by FERC dated 
August 2016, and supporting documents . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); id. (“Based on a review of all information 
contained in the application file and extensive 
coordination with the applicant [Tennessee Gas] 
. . . .”(emphasis added)); see also JA 438 (discussing 
Tennessee Gas’s alternatives analysis, and concluding that 
“the alternatives analysis carried out . . . was commiserate 
[sic] with the level of impact”). 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the Corps did not 
arbitrarily or capriciously ignore the compression 
alternative. 
C 
 We next consider whether the Corps rejected the 
compression alternative for rational reasons in accordance 
with the applicable law. We conclude that it did. 
 According to Riverkeeper, the Corps did not comply 
with two regulations when it rejected the compression 
alternative. First, Riverkeeper argues that the Corps failed 
to make sufficient findings under 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). 
Second, Riverkeeper argues that the Corps was required to 
hold Tennessee Gas to a heightened standard under 40 
C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) and failed to do so. We address each 
argument in turn. 
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1 
 First, Riverkeeper argues that the Corps erroneously 
rejected the compression alternative by failing to make 
appropriate findings under 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). We 
reject that argument. 
 Under that regulatory provision, “no discharge of 
dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is a [1] 
practicable alternative to the proposed discharge [2] which 
would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, 
[3] so long as the alternative does not have other 
significant adverse environmental consequences.” 40 
C.F.R. § 230.10(a). Riverkeeper argues that the 
compression alternative satisfies all three conditions. 
 We agree with Riverkeeper that compression meets the 
first two prongs, but the Corps properly concluded that 
compression would “have other significant adverse 
environmental consequences.” Id. 
 a. Practicability. First, the Corps may reject an 
alternative if it is not practicable. Id. “An alternative is 
practicable if it is available and capable of being done after 
taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and 
logistics in light of overall project purposes.” Id. 
§ 230.10(a)(2). 
 The Corps argues that, based on information in 
Tennessee Gas’s application and the draft Environmental 
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Assessment, compression would result in “higher Project 
operating and fuel costs,” JA 408, and would have lower 
“economic efficiency” than the Orion Project, JA 211. The 
Corps argues that “this information alone would support a 
finding that the compression alternative was not 
‘practicable’ under the Guidelines.” Resp. Br. 32. 
 First, the fact that an alternative might have some 
unquantified higher operating cost does not mean the 
alternative is not “available” or “capable of being done.” 
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2). More information would be 
required to reach that conclusion. Cf. Jones, 741 F.3d at 
1002 (finding an alternative impracticable because “no 
one would seek financing to build a refining facility if it 
were not possible to extract a sufficient quantity of 
minerals to make the project profitable”). 
 Second, while the Corps’ alternatives analysis 
discussed the environmental implications of the Orion 
Project relative to the alternatives, it never once mentioned 
costs or practicability. See JA 438. We are unable to 
“supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the 
agency itself has not given.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. 
at 43 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947)). To be sure, the Corps’ “Conclusion” section 
asserts that “there are no reasonable or practicable 
alternatives.” JA 446. But the agency did not articulate any 
reasoning in support of that conclusion, let alone any 
reasoning applicable to compression. The absence of any 
reasoning is especially critical in light of FERC’s draft 
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Environmental Assessment, which concluded that 
building a new compressor station would be practicable. 
See JA 212 (“This alternative meets the purpose and need, 
[and] is technically feasible.”). 
 Accordingly, we cannot uphold the Corps’ decision on 
practicability grounds. 
 b. Aquatic impacts. Second, an alternative must “have 
less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230.10(a). The Corps wisely does not argue this issue. 
As the draft Environmental Assessment concludes, the 
compression alternative would “eliminate 30 waterbody 
crossings . . . and impacts on wetlands.” JA 212. 
 c. Overall environmental impact. That brings us to the 
final ground that the Corps may rely upon to reject the 
compression alternative. Even though compression may 
be “a practicable alternative . . . which would have less 
adverse impact on aquatic ecosystems,” the Corps 
properly concluded that it would “have other significant 
adverse environmental consequences.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230.10(a). Although the Corps’ analysis is not pellucid, 
the Corps determined as a practical matter that the 
permanent impacts of compression are sufficiently 
“significant.” 
 i. The Corps deemed the environmental impact of 
compression too “significant” to endorse. In its 
alternatives analysis, Tennessee Gas stated that “adding a 
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new (greenfield) compressor station would require 
Tennessee [Gas] to obtain approximately 40-acres per 
site,” and that construction “would require permanent 
vegetation clearing from the area in order to install 
permanent access roads, fencing, buildings and other 
appurtenance equipment . . . resulting in increased impacts 
to the environment.” Id. Tennessee Gas also observed that 
“a new (greenfield) compressor station would be an 
aboveground facility with light pollution and noise 
impacts and may also become a source of [greenhouse gas] 
emissions.” Id. In contrast to those permanent 
environmental impacts, the land affected by the Orion 
Project “will be allowed to re-vegetate to minimize and 
mitigate possible environmental impacts.” Id. 
 In its alternatives analysis, the Corps favored the Orion 
Project for those same reasons: 
[Tennessee Gas] examined several 
alternatives . . . including . . . Compression 
Alternatives . . . . The preferred alternative 
co-locates the new pipe within the existing 
right of way, thereby avoiding clearing of a 
new greenway. The majority of impacts are 
temporary, and will be restored to minimize 
the resultant impact. Permanent conversion 
in impacts are from one wetland type (PFO or 
PSS) to another wetland type (PEM), and do 
not result in wetlands being converted to 
uplands. 
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JA 438. The Corps articulated a clear preference for 
temporary environmental impacts, in direct contrast to the 
permanent impacts of compression cross-referenced in 
Tennessee Gas’s report. The Corps’ conclusion, therefore, 
amounts to judgment that permanent environmental 
impacts—including those from compression—are 
“significant” in this context. 
 Riverkeeper objects that the Corps never explicitly 
found any impact “significant.” But the omission of that 
singular word is not fatal. Even if the agency’s decision is 
“of less than ideal clarity,” we will uphold it “if the 
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. 
at 286). Here, the agency’s path can reasonably be 
discerned: the Corps rejected the compression alternative 
on the ground that its permanent impacts—including 
permanent de-vegetation of forty to eighty acres of 
greenfield and light, noise, and greenhouse gas 
emissions—would be significant under 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230.10(a). 
 ii. The Corps’ finding was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Riverkeeper further objects that, even if the Corps 
implicitly found the permanent environmental impact of 
compression “significant,” that finding was clearly 
erroneous. Applying our deferential standard of review, 
we reject that argument. 
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 According to Riverkeeper, the Orion Project would 
result in “long-term impact[s] on forested areas (30 to 50 
years to reach preconstruction mature tree size and 
densities)” on over 47 acres of forested uplands. JA 282. 
Additionally, the project would result in “222.6 more acres 
of total disturbed land, over a hundred more acres of 
impacts to agricultural lands, nearly 6 more acres of 
permanently deforested wetlands, 15 more acres of 
impacts to water resources, impact on 65 more wetlands 
and 31 more streams, and will traverse 2,100 feet of steep 
slopes.” Reply Br. 15. By contrast, light, air, and sound 
pollution from compression were never quantified, 
according to Riverkeeper. 
 The Corps concedes that the Orion Project will disturb 
more land. But it is well supported in the record, and 
Riverkeeper does not dispute, that the land will be restored 
and allowed to revegetate. See JA 664 (“[I]f Tennessee 
[Gas] complies with the construction and restoration 
methods described . . . the impacts on waterbodies and 
wetlands would be minor and temporary.”); JA 665 (“The 
required mitigation measures are adequately protective 
and will be enforced.”). That regrowth may occur over a 
long period of time, but the compression alternative’s 
impacts would continue indefinitely. And as for the Orion 
Project’s permanent effects on wetlands, those were not 
concerning to the Corps based on its expert judgment. See 
JA 438 (“Permanent conversion in impacts are from one 
wetland type (PFO or PSS) to another wetland type 
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(PEM), and do not result in wetlands being converted to 
uplands.”). 
 When evaluating the significance of certain aquatic 
impacts, the Corps is instructed to put “special emphasis 
on the persistence and permanence of the effects.” 40 
C.F.R. § 230.10(c); see also id. § 230.1 (“The guiding 
principle should be that degradation or destruction of 
special sites may represent an irreversible loss of valuable 
aquatic resources.”). We conclude that it was not a clear 
error of judgment for the Corps to apply similar reasoning 
to other kinds of environmental considerations, 
particularly when the Orion Project would not result in any 
net loss of wetlands or other aquatic resources. 
 Riverkeeper further objects that environmental impacts 
of compression cannot be “significant” under the 
Guidelines because FERC has found similar projects not 
significant under NEPA. See Minisink Residents for Envtl. 
Pres. & Safety v. F.E.R.C., 762 F.3d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). That analogy is unpersuasive because the 
requirements of NEPA are different and not at issue here. 
 By Riverkeeper’s logic, the Corps could only reject an 
alternative as having “other significant adverse 
environmental consequences,” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a), if 
the alternative would also constitute a “major Federal 
action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment” under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
Riverkeeper’s approach finds no support in any regulation 
 32 
 
or case. It conflates two bodies of law with different text, 
authorship,10 and purpose. 
 For example, finding significance under NEPA triggers 
a duty to prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement 
rather than a concise Environmental Assessment. See 
Lower Alloways Creek Twp. v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 
687 F.2d 732, 740 (3d Cir. 1982). If we were to adopt this 
definition of significance, the Guidelines would fail to 
address situations where an alternative’s impact would be 
significant enough to be substantially worse for the 
environment than the proposed project, but would not be 
                                                 
 10 The Guidelines are promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, whereas NEPA’s 
implementing regulations are promulgated by the Council 
on Environmental Quality. For purposes of NEPA, 
“significantly” is defined by regulation. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.27. Riverkeeper does not, and cannot, argue that 
the same definition is controlling here. To the contrary, the 
Corps acted consistently with the understanding of 
significance expounded elsewhere in the Guidelines. See, 
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(o)(3)(v) (“For an effect to 
be significant, it must be more than speculative or 
insubstantial.”); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (“Findings 
of significant degradation . . . shall be based upon 
appropriate factual determinations, . . . with special 
emphasis on the persistence and permanence of the 
effects.”). 
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significant enough to constitute a “major Federal 
action[].” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Nothing in § 230.10(a) 
requires the Corps to insist on such an alternative. 
 Even under NEPA, determining significance is more art 
than science. “By adding the word ‘significantly,’ . . . 
Congress apparently was willing to depend primarily upon 
the agency’s good faith determination as to what conduct 
would be sufficiently serious from an ecological 
standpoint to require use of the full-scale procedure.” Pub. 
Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 
256, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst, 
471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972)). Here, the Corps acted 
consistently with that understanding: it made a “good faith 
determination” that the permanent environmental 
consequences of certain alternatives, including 
compression, “would be sufficiently serious from an 
ecological standpoint” to prefer the Orion Project. Id. 
 Accordingly, the Corps’ finding that the compression 
alternative had other significant adverse impacts on the 
environment, precluding its selection, was not arbitrary or 
capricious based on the record before us. 
2 
 Riverkeeper’s final argument is that the Corps erred by 
failing to conduct a water-dependency analysis and by 
failing to hold Tennessee Gas to a heightened standard 
applicable to non-water-dependent projects. While the 
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Corps did not make an explicit water-dependency finding, 
its failure to do so was harmless because the Corps took 
an appropriately hard look at the project alternatives. 
 As described above, a project is water dependent if it 
“require[s] access or proximity to or sit[s] within the 
special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose.” 
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). “Examples of water dependent 
projects include, but are not limited to, dams, marinas, 
mooring facilities, and docks. The basic purpose of these 
projects is to provide access to the water.” Sierra Club v. 
Van Antwerp, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Army Corps of Engineers Standard Operating 
Procedures for the Regulatory Program (Oct. 15, 1999)), 
aff’d, 362 F. App’x 100 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 If the project is not water dependent, “practicable 
alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites are 
presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated 
otherwise.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). The applicant can 
“clearly demonstrate[] otherwise,” id., by putting forward 
“detailed, clear and convincing” information showing that 
non-aquatic alternatives are unavailable, Utahns for Better 
Transp., 305 F.3d at 1186. “This does not require a specific 
level of detail to rebut the presumption, but only record 
evidence the agency took a hard look at the proposals and 
reached a meaningful conclusion based on the evidence.” 
Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 702 F.3d 1156, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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 Here, Riverkeeper is correct that the Corps did not 
make any finding regarding water dependency. But that 
was harmless error. Assuming that the Orion Project is not 
water dependent, and assuming that Tennessee Gas was 
required to overcome a heightened burden, the Corps’ 
determination was still sufficient. Based on Tennessee 
Gas’s environmental report, combined with the Corps’ 
concern with permanent environmental impacts, we 
conclude that the Corps “took a hard look at the proposals 
and reached a meaningful conclusion based on the 
evidence.” Hillsdale, 702 F.3d at 1168. 
 To be sure, the Corps did not conduct a detailed 
analysis of the compression alternative. But under the 
principle of commensurate review, it was not required to 
do so. “Although all requirements in § 230.10 must be 
met, the compliance evaluation procedures will vary to 
reflect the seriousness of the potential for adverse impacts 
on the aquatic ecosystems posed by specific dredged or fill 
material discharge activities.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10; see also 
id. § 230.6(a). The Corps explicitly endorsed Tennessee 
Gas’s analysis under that rubric: “Based upon the level of 
impact to aquatic resources, it was determined that the 
alternatives analysis carried out in order to avoid aquatic 
resource impacts was commiserate [sic] with the level of 
impact.” JA 438. 
 Thus, we conclude that the Corps acted in accordance 
with the applicable regulations when it rejected the 
compression alternative. 
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V 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will uphold the decision 
of the Corps and deny the petition for review. 
